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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
AFTON S. SEEGMILLER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
WESTERN MEN, INC.,
A California Corporation,
WESTERN GIRL, INC.,
A California Corporation,
EDWARD HOOPES,
A resident of the State of Utah,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No.
10939

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from the Judgment of the
Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
WESTERN MEN CONTRACT MAY BE TERMINATED
WITHOUT CAUSE AND THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT CAUSE TO JUSTIFY TERMINATION OF
THE WESTERN GIRL CONTRACT.
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POINT II
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
A BREACH OF CONTRACT ON THE PART OF WESTERN MEN, INC. AND WESTERN GIRL, INC. AND IN
FAILING TO GRANT DAMAGES TO THE PLAINTIFF
FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT.
POINT V
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS RELIEVED OF ANY FURTHER OBLIGATIONS TO THE DEFENDANTS BY
REASON OF THE BREACH OF CONTRACT BY THE
DEFENDANTS.
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action based on written contracts by which
the Plaintiff seeks to have the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree amended or set aside.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried without a jury before the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, one of the judges of the Third
Judicial District Court on the 6th and 7th days of March,
1967. The Court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Decree. Said Decree awards some damages to
Plaintiff. Plaintiff appeals the Decree as being insufficient.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks modification of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree or seeks a new trial in the
alternative.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Defendants Western Girl, Inc. and Western Men
Inc. are California corporations organized to provide'
temporary employees for clients in the temporary labor
market. In Salt Lake City the Defendant Corporations
operated on a franchise basis (R 113, 114).
The Plaintiff, Afton S. Seegmiller, entered into a contract with the Defendant Western Girl, Inc. on the 19th
day of March, 1964 (R 24). She had been previously employed at $500.00 per month (R 260). She paid $250.00
for the Western Girl franchise (R 264) (R 137). The
Plaintiff operated its Western Girl franchise until the
24th day of March, 1965 (R-29) at which time she obtained a similar franchise contract with the Defendant,
Western Men, Inc. The Plaintiff thereafter operated both
franchises without incident until December 26, 1966
when the Defendants unilaterally terminated the Western Men, Inc. and Western Girl, Inc. contracts (R 236,
142, 143).
In March of 1965, an officer of Western Men, Inc. approached the Plaintiff and asked her if she would be interested in having a franchise and in helping to administer a labor contract between the General Services Administration of the United States Government at Clearfield, Utah and Western Men, Inc. (R 205, P-1, P-2). It
was because of the G.S.A. contract that the Plaintiff obtained the Western Men franchise agreement. Subsequently, the G.S.A. contract expired and another was
negotiated and expired and a third G.S.A. contract was
entered into on October 1, 1966. The amount of profit
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which accrued to the Plaintiff as a franchise under the
first two G.S.A. contracts was nominal (R-214). However, because of the Viet Nam conflict, substantial work
was being developed under the third G.S.A. contract (R
217, 218, 219). Plaintiff stood in a position to earn a good
profit after working and sacrificing for two years to build
the business. On December 26, 1966, however, two officers of the companies came to Salt Lake City and demanded that the Plaintiff sign a release and give up her
franchise operation. The Plaintiff refused and the officers
of the Defendant Corporations attempted to serve her
with a notice of termination of both franchise agreements
(R 235, 236, 142, 143). The notices provided for termination within 60 days as the contracts provide, however, the
officers of the Defendant corporations did replace the
Plaintiff immediately and went to the G.S.A. offices to
introduce a new employee of defendants and told G.S.A.
that the Plaintiff, Mrs. Seegmiller would no longer be
handling the G.S.A. accounts (R 236, 237).
Based on the contract the Plaintiff filed the original
Complaint herein, posted a bond and obtained a temporary injunction against the Defendant Corporations and
their employee Edward Hoopes. On the 3rd day of January, 1967 (R 5, 9, 10), the Plaintiff further provided for
an Order to Show Cause to be served on the Defendants
to appear before the above court and show cause why
the temporary Restraining Order should not be made
permanent pending final hearing of the case (R 9, 10).
The Order to Show Cause was heard on January 12,
1967 and the Court rendered a decision which kept the
Restraining Order in force on all aspects of both the
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Western Men and Western Girl contracts except in matters concerning the G.S.A. contract. Since the G.S.A. contract was the large bulk of the business, the decision effectively destroyed the Plaintiff's ability to operate. The
Order of the Court was issued January 17 at which time
the Plaintiff stopped operating the franchises (R 54, 55,
56, 57).
The Order of the Court in effect restrained the Plaintiff from operating under the contract and thus the Plaintiff who asked for relief and posted bond for temporary
relief found herself restrained in all the profitable aspects of her contract by Defendants who had not asked
for an Order of Relief nor had they posted bond as required by law (R 55, 56). During the time the Plaintiff
operated the franchises, she expanded the business to a
greater degree than the contracts required and production was steadily increasing (R 135, 136, R 214).
The Western Men Contract was negotiated exclusively
to service the G.S.A. contract. (P 1, 2, 4, 5) and the Plaintiff was advised to service only G.S.A. if she so desired
(P-5). The correspondence concerning the contract
shows that the Plaintiff was to operate the Contract on
the "Wasatch front", Salt Lake City, Ogden, and Clearfield. (P-12. 4, 5)
The Plaintiff at all times had an office and telephone
contact and the Defendants did not at any time question
the Plainitiff's office arrangements until after this lawsuit began. (R 129, 155, 156). The Defendants further
stated that the reason for termination was the concern
over the G.S.A. contract, but the notice strained to find
other reasons of failure. (P 22, R 120, 121).

•
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The cost to the Plaintiff in operating the Franchises to
December 31, 1967 was as follows:
WESTERN GIRL
Six months of 1964
Three mo. of 1965
Nine months of 1965
Twelve mo. of 1966

$727.70
$554.02
$229.02
$187.06

per
per
per
per

month = $4,366.20
month = 1,662.06
month = 2,061.18
month = 2,244,72

Total expenditures on Western Girl:
Paid:

$10,334.16
250.00
$10,584.16

WESTERN MEN
Nine months of 1965 $327.27 per month = $2,945.43
Twelve mo. of 1966 $165.71 per month = 1,988.52
TOTAL:
TOTAL of Western Men and Western
Girl Expenditures:
(R 262, 263, 264)

$4,933.95
$15,518.11

Mr. Stover one of the officers of the Defendant Corporations stated that the Western Girl contract was
worth $7,800.00 (R 289).
The record is not clear as to what the profit to the
franchisee would have been to the end of the current
G.S.A. contracts because this would be speculation. However, it could now be determined as to the period of the
G.S.A. contract has expired.
The Western Men Contract, among other things, recites as follows:
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" (a) In connection with the operation of a temporary
placement service . . . the mailing of payroll checks,
handling of all bookkeeping and all other details incident
to a temporary payroll including preparation of necessary payroll reports and returns.
(b) Losses from uncollectable accounts ... by withholding from the amount due to you one percent of each
period in that billing. The maximum in this account will
be one percent of your highest consecutive thirteen period billings . . .
(1) We agree at our expense to have one of our
trained representatives visit your office to assist you in
the development and promotion of sales under this agency and to perform other such services as may be helpful
to you. The schedule calls for one visit per year.
( 4) . . . In the event you find it necessary to terminate this agency arrangement or where it is terminated in
the event of your death, you or your legal heirs will have
the option to sell the agency established by this agreement to a person or persons who have received our approval . . .
( 5) . . . In the event we wish to terminate, we will
likewise give you sixty days notice in writing ... "
The Defendants, although complaining of the failure
of the Plaintiff to service the contract were shown to be
almost completely responsible for the failure of the payroll (R 145, 150, 151, 152, 162, 163, 220, 221). Mr. Edwards could only find one example of an error of the
Plaintiff (R 164, 165). The Plaintiff, in an effort to cor-
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rect payroll problems, paid payroll from her own personal account (R 222).
After the Court hearing on January 12, 1967, the Defendants in violation of their contract have held all additional payments due the Plaintiff under the excuse that
the amount held was for bad debt reserve (R 250, 251,
153, 154). The Plaintiff was given no opportunity to sell
her franchise either in Western Men or Western Girl.
Stover, one of the Defendant officers, stated that the
franchise was worth $7 ,800.00 (R 153, 289).
During the time that the Plaintiff held the franchise
agreements with Western Men and Western Girl, she
was never assisted or helped by the "home office" even
though the home office was considering terminating the
Plaintiff's franchise and was fearful over the G.S.A. contract (Rl26, 127, 128).
The Defendants did not follow the provisions of the
Contract in effecting its termination. They attempted to
obtain a signed Voluntary Termination Agreement and
were unable to do so (P-31, R 236, 237). And unilaterally
imposed an employee on the operation of the G.S.A. Contract and had the unilateral termination sustained in
Court.
The Court, in its memorandum of decisions dated
March 8 (R 83) in paragraph 2 recognizes that it had
erred in its prior order (R57):
"and the Court was therefore in error in not con·
tinuing the injunction until the 60-day period was
up."
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE WESTERN MEN CONTRACT MAY BE TERMINATED WITHOUT CAUSE AND THAT THERE WAS
SUFFICIENT CAUSE TO JUSTIFY TERMINATION OF
THE WESTERN GIRL CONTRACT.
Williston 1017A states on contracts of employment concerning the distributor-dealer franchise arrangement
which is analoguous to the present case:
"The elaborate instruments used to create these
distributorships it should be remembered, are almost invariably drawn by or on behalf of the manufacturer and presented to the dealer or exclusive
agent simply for his signature, not for further negotiation. The very fact that so frequently this carefully drawn instrument leaves the question of its
termination, 'an obligation incompletely expressed'
and the startingly disproportionate burden otherwise cast upon the dealer should here, as in the requirement and output contracts justify the Courts in
inferring an intention to bind both parties for at
least such time as may be required to demonstrate
the cause or to establish grounds for honest dissatisfaction or otherwise for a reasonable time just as
where no other promise is made. And further these
contracts are made, if not upon an express promise,
at least upon the understanding and expectation that
the dealer will make a substantial investment in
establishing or maintaining a business equipment or
a service such as will successfully promote the sale
of manufactured products within the territory ...
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It is significant too, that reservations of a right of
termination for designated cause have been held not
to invalidate such exclusive contracts otherwise sufficiently definate as to duration, on the ground that
they do not confer a power at will but one heard on
objective tests. And it has also been so held where
the dissatisfaction of the manufacturer has been
made the criterion for termination of the exclusive
contract."

ARD Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. vs. Dr. Pepper Co. (202
F 2d 372)
In an action between licensee and distributor soft drink
company contract provided that if licensee within judgment of Distributor "Fails to faithfully comply ... then
upon written notice, the Distributor shall be entitled to
cancel." The Court stated: "Courts are cautious in enforcing such contracts literally when to do so would result in injustice. Courts tend to adopt an interpretation of
the contract wherever possible requiring performance to
the satisfaction of a reasonable man.
The same decision is reached in California Courts in
Collins vs. Victor Manor Inc., (306 P2d 783, 47 Calif. 2d
875).
In Watkins vs. Rich, 254 Mich 82, 235 NW 845, the Courts
took the position that a contract terminable upon written
notice could not be terminated except for cause. (See
also: Moon Motor Car of New York, V Moon Motor Car
Co. (29 f2d3 cca2).
In Erskine vs. Chevrolet Motor Company (185 N.C. 479,
117 SE 706). In distributor dealer contract, the sales
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agency held entitled to recover expenses and profits upon
cancellation of contract by automobile company.
In Terre Haute Brewing Company vs. Dugan (102 F2d
425 (CCA8):

The Court noted that in Missouri, the general rule is
subject to the limitation that "if it appears that the agent,
induced by his appointment has incurred expense in the
matter of agency without having had sufficient opportunity to recoup from the undertaking, the principal will be
required to compensate him in that amount."
Good faith on the part of the Distributor in all cases
seems to be one of the criterion for deciding whether or
not the termination of a contract will be enforced.
A careful review of the record would raise some
serious doubts as to the good faith of the defendant Corporations. Consider:
(a) no warning or notice was given to Plaintiff that
her contract was in jeopardy;
(b) conversations by officers of Defendant Corporations with Defendant Hoopes;
( c) difference between the testimony as to reason for
termination of notice and that stated in the notice itself
gives rise to the question, were the defendants searching
for an excuse to terminate the contracts?
( d) failure of Defendants to send anyone to help with
contracts;
( e) complete ignorance of the Defendants as to office
locations prior to time of trial;
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(f) Inability to show failure of plaintiff to properlv
handle payroll and with one brief exception to obtain all
employees needs for the GSA contract.

It is submitted that the procedure of the Defendant
corporations in the alleged termination of the contracts
was not in good faith and the Court should find that in
the absence of cause shown, a notice of termination is not
in good faith and is not sufficient to cancel the contract.
This case is, in many aspects, analagous to the line of
cases decided by the Utah State Supreme Court in the
area of forfeiture of equities under a uniform real estate
contract.
Under Spencer vs. Perkins (121Utah468 243 P2d 466),
the Court set out just what rights a forfeiting vendor
might have on a repossession. These were outlined as
follows:
"Vendors are entitled to any loss occasioned to them
by any of these factors: (1) less of an advantageous
bargain; (2) damage to or depreciation of the property; (3) any decline in market value of the property
and ( 4) for the fair rental value of the property
during the period of occupancy."
It is obvious that there was no lack of bargain. Mr.
Stover (defendant officer) stated that Western Girl
Franchise was worth $7 ,800.00. There was also no loss
through depreciation, no loss of market value, and the
percentage payment received on employment secured
during the operation of the contract would adequately
pay reasonable rental value. Under this doctrine the
the plaintiffs would be entitled to the increased value of
the franchise operation.
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POINT II
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
BREACH OF CONTRACT ON THE PART OF WESTERN MEN AND WESTERN GIRL AND IN FAILING
TO GRANT DAMAGES TO THE PLAINTIFF FOR
BREACH OF CONTRACT.

Williston, 1967, Ed, Sec 1017, p. 169.
As has been said, several courts have held that even
where there is a direct reservation of a right to terminate, otherwise than at will, any violation of the terms of
the agreement before it is terminated in the specific way
provided for is actionable.
Atlas Brewing Company vs. Hoffman (217 Iowa 1217,
252 NW 133).
"In the trial of the agent's counterclaim for a breach
of oral contract giving the agent exclusive sales
agency, evidence of exact quantity of principals
products sold in agents territory by successor agency
and of sales of subagencies established by counterclaimant and of costs and expenses and value of
time expended in selling product, and of what net
profits and commissions would have been was properly admitted."
Smith vs. Mendonsa (238 P.2d 1039 108 CA 2d 540)
"It is the duty of courts to encourage keeping of
agreements properly made and to give adequate
remedy for breach thereof when it occurs, particularly where breach is deliberate and wrong and is
willful.''
Young vs. Borden Broadcasting Co. (255 P2d 888, 75 Ariz
298).
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"Where the contract has been breached by one party,
the other party to the contract, having fully performed his part of the contract up to date of breach
may sue either on contract or quantum merit." '
In the instant case, the Defendants were so anxious to
terminate the contract that they actually went to the
G.S.A. point of operation and imposed their own employee. They did not honor the contract which provides
for a 60 day notice. Notwithstanding the existence or nonexistence of cause for termination, the contract was
breached by the Defendants by premature intervention.
The defendants even secured the assistance of the Court
in sustaining their position and entering an Order restraining the Plaintiff from performing her contract.
Said Order was entered on January 12, 1967 (R-57).
POINT III
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS RELIEVED OF ANY FUR·
THER OBLIGATIONS TO THE DEFENDANTS BY
REASON OF BREACH OF CONTRACT BY THE DE·
FENDANTS.
It is fundamental law that if the Promisor is himself
the cause of failure of performance, either of the obligation to him or of conditions upon which his own liability
depends, he cannot take advantage of failure and there·
fore any further performance is excused when perform·
ance has been prevented.

Cladianos vs. Friedhoff, (240 P2 208, 69 NEV. 41).
Big Boy Drilling Corporation, Ltd vs. Etheridge, et al.
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(111P2d953, 44 CA2d 114).
Also see Utah case of Swanner vs. Union Mortgage
Company (105 P2d 342, 99 UT 298).
This is the fact situation in the case at hand. The Defendants breached the contract in two ways:
(1) By imposing a termination outside the contractual provisions, and
(2) By terminating the Contracts by notice, but without cause.
The Plaintiff should, therefore, be affirmatively relieved of any further performance under the contracts.
CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff seeks to have the Decree of the lower
Court modified to find as follows:
TO FIND
1. No right in Defendants to terminate Western Men
and Western Girl contracts without cause;
2.

That no cause existed for such termination;

3. That the Defendants did terminate the Western
Men and Western Girl Contracts and that such termination constituted a breach of contract;
4. That the Plaintiff is entitled to damages equal to
herr costs of development of the franchises, namely:
$10,584.16 for Western Girl Contract, and
$ 4,933.95 for Western Men Contract, or
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that the case be remanded to the Court for determination
of the amount of profit which could have been realized
on the operation of the Contracts over a reasonable period of time by the Plaintiff and that a reasonable period
of time be not less than the months of operation left in
the G.S.A. contract.
5. That the Plaintiff has no further duty to the Defendants under the Western Men and Western Girl Contracts.
Respectfully submitted,
LORIN N. PACE
WATKINS, PACE & WATKINS
336 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah

